A key question in international corporate governance is why certain in ownership types are prevalent in different countries around the world (La Prota et al., 1999). In this study, we provide an answer for the prevalence of the family-owned firms in 42 countries by examining key characteristics of culture. We show that family-ownership is positively correlated with power distance (PD), in-group collectivism (Cl) and, insignificantly, with uncertainty avoidance (UA).
Introduction
A crucial component of corporate governance is ownership structure. Among the possible configurations, including ownership by state, family, individuals, financial institutions such as banks, and the widely-held corporation, the family-owned firm is of special interest. The main research question of this study is whether cultural differences impact the prevalence of familyowned firms.
This research question is important for two reasons. First, family-controlled firms are not subject to the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management, that characterizes widely-held, management-controlled firms (see e.g., La Porta et al., 2000; Lins, 2003; Maury, 2005; Mueller, 2006) . Rather, minor shareholders are concerned that their share in the firm will not be expropriated by the major shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000 , Schulze et al., 2001 Stultz, 2005) . Expropriation can take a variety of forms. In some instances, the controlling owners simply divert the profits. For example, Sir Conrad Black awarded himself millions dollars of"no competition fees" without the knowledge of his board of directors. In other instances, the insiders sell output, assets or additional securities in the firm they control to another firm in their control or take loans that benefits a business they control. Adelphia, the once seventh largest cable company in the United States, is an example of this technique. The controlling Rigas family borrowed hundreds of millions of dollars in the name of Adelphia to finance other business ventures and the debt contract specified that Adelphia is responsible for the debt even if it does not enjoy any benefit from it. Other forms of expropriation is to divert corporate opportunities from the firm, as Scrushy, who founded, managed as a CEO, and chaired the board of directors of Health South, established a real estate enterprise that sold properties to HealthSouth. In other instances, expropriation involves 41Page i .· installing possibly unqualified family members in managerial positions (see Bukhart et al., 2003 and the citations therein) or overpaying executives and giving them excessive perks (Chen et al., 2009 ).
Second, family-owned firms are quite prevalent all over the world and, with a few exceptions (Faccio and Lang 2002) , families in family-owned firms augment their control rights beyond the level of their cash flows rights. They supplement their control by designing pyramid holdings, having dual-class shares, taking over the actual management of the firm (Babchuk et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999a; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Morck et al., 2003 , Joh, 2003 Lins, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Masulis et al., 2009) and controlling the board (Anderson and · Reeb, 2004) . Studies that calculate the voting control of corporations internationally found that family-controlled firms remain more prevalent than the wide-spread firms envisioned by Berle and Means (1932) . La Porta et al. (1999a) reported that in their 1995 sample of the twenty largest firms (as measured by market capitalization) in 27 developed countries, 30% are controlled by a family (where control is measured by having at least I 0% of control rights) and that this percentage is much higher for smaller firms. Claessens et al., (2000) , who studied 2,980 publicly-traded companies in nine East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) found that more than half of the east Asian corporations are controlled by families. Lins (2003) studied the control structure in 1,433 firms in 18 emerging market using data set from 1995 and reported that managers and their families are the largest blockholder in two-thirds of his sample firms.
Furthermore, family ownership is sometimes concentrated in the hands of a few families.
Claessens et al. (2000) reported that in each country in their sample, the ultimate control of the corporate sector rests in the hands of a small number of families. At the extreme, the Suharto and SI Page the Ayala families ultimately controll6.6% and 17.1% of total market capitalization in Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively. The largest ten families in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand control half of the corporate sector (in terms of market capitalization), while the largest ten families in Hong Kong and Korea control about one-third of the corporate sector.
Even in the United States, which would seem to fit Bear le and Means' model of firms that are widely-owned and management-controlled, Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that one-third of the S&P 500, the largest US firms, are managed or controlled by a founding family who owns on the average 11% of cash flows rights and 18% voting rights. Family members serve as top executives or CEO in 63% of the companies and on the board as directors or as chairperson in 99%. Faccio and Lang (2002) analyzed the ultimate ownership and control of5,232 corporations in 13 western European countries found that over 44% are family controlled.
The observation that" [ v ] irtually all firms start out as family firms" (Mueller, 2006, p. 638) , implies that the issue of what drives the variation in the prevalence of family-controlled firm becomes an important question. [This question is a variation on the one asked by La Porta et al., (1999a, p. 473) , "What explains the differences in countries in their ownership patterns?"] The early attempts to answer this question examined the differences between legal regimes and focused on the legal protection of shareholders, because of the aforementioned concern of minor shareholders that the major shareholder will expropriate them (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999a; Burkart et al., 2003, Denis and McConnell, 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Luez et al., 2003; Ho et al., 2004; De Holan and Sanz. 2006) . The evidence suggests that familycontrolled firms are indeed more prevalent in countries with poor legal protection of minor shareholders. Considering that better protection strengthens capital market development and economic growth (see e.g., Dyck and Zingales, 2003) , the focus on legal protection does not provide a satisfactory answer, because governments have both the incentives and the ability to take actions that improve the protection of investors.
At this crossroads, the research divided into two strands. One examines governance at the firm level because, at that level, firms might achieve what a national legal system cannot, by tailoring their governance structure to investors' preferences (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; De Holan and Sanz, 2006; Ali et al., 2007) . While on the average, countries with better shareholder protection also have better governed firms, on the level of individual firms, there is no national pattern. Klapper and Love (2004) , for example, studied 495 firms in 18 sectors in 25 emerging markets and found that there is a wide variation in firm-level governance that is unrelated to the legal environment. There are well-governed firms in countries with a weak legal system and badly governed firms in countries With strong legal system.
Another approach was to trace legal protection to the country's history (La Prota et al., 2000) , to cultural differences that defined as a system of beliefs that shape the actions of individuals within a society, as manifested in religion and language (Stultz and Williamson, 2003) and the degree of tax compliance (Ho et al., 2004) . Religion was selected as a factor because the Roman Catholic Church is thought to foster power distance (defined below), which Putnam (1993) labeled "vertical bonds of authority" as opposed to "horizontal bonds of fellowship." Landes (1998) argues that Catholic and Muslim countries tend to be hostile towards institutional development because they develop xenophobic cultures and powerful bonds between church and state to maintain control, bonds which limit competition and private property rights protection. Religion, however, is an umbrella concept of cultural differences, and 71Page it seems that there is room to break culture into specific indicators in order to pinpoint specific factors that drive the prevalence of the family-owned firm.
In this study, we examined three specific indicators of culture that may explain the emergence of a family-controlled firm: power distance (PD), in-group collectivism (Cl) and uncertainty avoidance (UA).
Power Distance is the degree to which people respect power and authority. As an expression of the legitimacy accorded to status differences among social groups, PD can be expected to be of special relevance to a family's share in the firm's equity. In countries where PD is large, the owners of the family-owned firms are more likely to command respect and be effective leaders, which guarantees of the success and viability of the family-owned firm. Cl measures attitude towards individualism versus feeling of belonging to a group or the family.
The higher this measure, the higher the importance of family in the society, which enhances the prestige of the family-owned firm. Finally, uncertainty avoidance measures tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. The higher UA, the lower the need to lean on the family when one initiates a risky businesses.
We find that the first two variables explain the likelihood of high concentration of familyowner firms in our 42-country sample, but unlike Buck and Shahrim (2005) who also use UA to explain the emergence offamily-controlled firms rather than widely-held firms, we find that this attribute is insignificant. Specifically, power distance increases the chance that the average country in our sample will have an above-average concentration of familycowned firms by 95% and in-group collectivism by 99%.
Our contribution to the literature on governance is twofold. While there is literature establishing that cultural dimensions affect certain elements of firm governance such as SI Page ( accounting, infonnation disclosure, self-dealing, insider trading, and executive pay (Licht, 2001 , Mintz, 2005 . See also the survey in Buck and Shahrim, 2005) , we know of no prior research studying the impact of cultural differences on the prevalence of family-owned finn as an ownership type. In doing so, we deepen our understanding of why different countries have different concentration of family-owned finns beyond the prior literature finding of the link between culture, language, and tax compliance to this type of ownership as discussed above.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we present the hypotheses and the theory behind the control variables. Sections 3 and 4 present the methodology and results, respectively, and Section 5, summarizes.
Hypotheses and Control Variables

Hypotheses
As discussed in the Introduction, our contribution to the international literature on the likelihood of family-owned finns focuses on country-specific cultural dimensions. We hypothesize that PD, UA, and Cl will be the premier cultural dimensions for explaining the differences in the weight of family shareholders in goods and services markets between countries. The use of separate dimensions in lieu of a composite measure follows Shenkar's (200 I) criticism that Kogut and Singh' s (1988) study of cultural distance made "an invalid assumption of equivalence."
Power distance (PD) is the degree to which people expect power and authority to be distributed and expressed equitably or inequitably (Hofstede, 1980 (Hofstede, , 1983 Car! et al., 2004) . The tenn was coined by Mulder (1977) regarding the degree of inequality in power between a less powerful individual and a more powerful individual, when both belong to the same social 9IPage system. Higher levels of power distance are consistent with higher regard towards authoritative figures such as father figures. Therefore, it can be expected that PD will be of special relevance to family weight in equity because it is an expression of the legitimacy accorded to status differences among social groups. The implication of power distance at the firm level is that power distance reflects the level of comfort within certain control levels: for instance, employees in low power distance cultures tend to favor consultative management styles, while those in high power distance cultures typically opt for an authoritarian or paternalistic style (Hofstede, 1980 (Hofstede, , 1997 House et al., 2004) . In the GLOBE project, "power distance" was defined as "the degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be shared unequally" (House et al., 2004, p. 517) . We hypothesize that
Hl: High levels of power distance in the country's culture will be positively related to an increased weight of family shareholders.
Individualism/Collectivism (Cl) measures the extent to which the self or, alternatively, the group, is the prime social identifier (Hofstede, 1997) . The GLOBE research distinguishes between "institutionalism collectivism" and "in-group collectivism," the former focusing on the societal and organizational levels while the latter focuses on the individual level . In-group collectivism is defined as ''the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or families" 12 [emphasis added]). Individualist cultures emphasize personal achievement, personal accountability and performance based-evaluation; people consider themselves independent and autonomous. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures the emphasis shifts to group coordination and to stable group membership (Hofstede, 1997) , combined with group decision-making (Gelfand et al., 2004) . Since the viability of a family-controlled firm depends on its profitability, which · 10 I Page requires the cooperation of its constituency, and because a higher percentage ofbusiness activity in collective-oriented cultures takes place between friends and family, we hypothesize that:
H2: High levels of individualism in the country culture will be positively related to higher weight of family shareholders.
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) assesses the degree to which a society's members are able to cope with the unpredictability of the future and the resulting ambiguity (Hofstede, 1980) . UA was defined in GLOBE in terms of structured lifestyles, clear specification of social expectations, and rules and laws to regulate uncertain situations. Cultures with high uncertainty avoidance tend to favor certainty. Several previous studies claim that the UA dimension influences corporate governance. Following Licht et al. (2004) , who links UA to certain characteristics of governance, Buck and Shahrim (2005) use UA to explain the emergence of family-controlled firm instead of the widely-held firm. High UA will create a "family-based capitalism." A plausible explanation is that high UA encourages entrepreneurs to lean on family members more. As a result, different types of corporate governance evolves in different countries. We hypothesize that:
H3: High levels of uncertainty avoidance in the home country culture will be positively related to higher weight of family shareholders.
Control Variables
To improve the analysis, we considered seveal control variables that the literature has already established as relevant to our research: information and disclosure, the banking system, and development of capital market.
Share of banking sector in private hands
Diamond (1991) and Tirole (2001) observed the importance ofreputational capital in the relationship between lender and borrower, meaning that lenders also consider the borrower's "character" and "track record." Consequently, if family-owned firm is considered more diversified because of its pyramidal holdings and has acquired a stronger record, it will be more likely that family-owned firms will not suffer from liquidity problems and be able to prosper and survive the larger the share of banking sector in private hands.
Information and disclosure
As La Porta et al. (2000) observed, expropriation activity creates "private benefit of control" for the controlling shareholders. However, attaining this private benefit requires secrecy. Ali et al. (2007) found, for example, that family-controlled S&P 500 firms disclose less information about their governance practice, although their reporting imd disclosure strategy is better in other dimensions, such as bad-news warnings and the quality of accounting information.
Since the market rewards disclosure and transparency (Durnev and Kim, 2005; La Porta et al., 2002) , increased disclosure makes family-owned firms more appealing to the shareholders and lend higher credibility to its reports (Fan and Wong, 2002) , because makes it more difficult to acquire the private benefit of control.
As a side comment, we observe that some studies find that countries with stronger investor protection have a higher quality of earnings and disclosures (Lutz et al., 2003 , Haw et al., 2004 , Francis et al., 2003 , which implies a negative association between the incidence of familyowned firms and disclosure because these firms are more prevalent in the weak-protection countries. This conclusion may be the outcome of a spurious correlation and will not be further pursued here, especially since Ali et al. (2007) and Jiraporn and DaDalt (2007) In principle, when loans are sufficiently large, the terms of the loan are based on negotiations between the lender (the bank) and the borrower (the family-controlled firm). As discussed in the Introduction, the managers of family-controlled firms are likely to manage additional businesses through pyramidal holdings. Hence, they are likely to have bargaining power that contributes to the success of family-owned firms. Bargaining power, however, depends on the alternative investment opportunities available to the lender. Hence, we expect that the relationship between the openness of bank capital to foreign shareholdings and the incidence of family-owned firms, and the relationship between foreign-owned or partly-foreignowned firms' access to loans from local banks and the incidence of family-owned firms to be both negative. Masulis et al. (2009) found that access to outside funding is crucial to the prevalence of family-owned business groups. As a matter of fact, this variable is more important to the survival of the family-owned firm than the strength of the corporate governance environment. Hence, the association between the presence of family-owned firms and this variable is expected to be positive.
Access of local firms to international financial markets
Methodology
Sample
To examine our hypotheses we used two major data sources: 
The 2006 Institutional Profiles Database
This database is a set of indicators on the institutional characteristics of 85 developed and developing countries that represent 90% of the planet's population and GDP. Its scope covers a broad spectrum of institutional characteristics including corporate governance, openness of To examine our hypotheses, we used data from 42 countries included in both the GLOBE and the Institutional Profiles Database surveys. See Table 1 for the list of the countries: 
Independent variables
We employ two groups of independent variables. The first group consists of three cultural variables from the GLOBE data: power distance (PD), in-group collectivism (CI) and uncertainty avoidance (UA). See Section 2 for the logic behind using these variables as the independent variables for explaining the weight of family shareholders. The second group includes the local financial market environment as captured by the Institutional Profiles Database. See Table 2 for the list ofthe variables we used in our regression as discussed in Section 2. We used logistical regression to test our hypotheses. The dependent variable in this study (weight of family shareholders) is a binary, independent variable, denoted as I when the country has a weight higher than the average of the 42 countries in the sample or 0 when it is lower than ------the average. We did not use an OLS r-egression because the dependent variable does not distribute normally and the sample is a small (n=42). This led to concern that the errors would not be normally distributed.
Results
The primary logistical regressions that result from our analysis are shown in Table 2 . As pointed out by Menard (2002) , logistical regression lacks widely-accepted measures equivalent to an R-square To sharpen our contribution, note that because the logit regression treats the dependent variable as a binary one, who is either one or zero, a positive coefficient on a dependent variable indicates a higher probability the dependent variable being one-the concentration of familyowned firms is above average--and a negative coefficient means a higher probability of zero--the concentration of family-owned firms is below average .
Equation I
shows how the coefficients indicate the probability of having I:
where P =the probability of having I. To illustrate the support that our regression provides for our hypotheses, we use Equation (I) to calculate the marginal impact the independent variables has on the probability of having I.
Consider, for instance, tbe power distance (PD). Substituting the coefficients (0.57) of the respective logit results (Table 2) for PD yields:
The results of Equation 2 are displayed in Figure I . TheY axis depicts the marginal effect on tbe probability moving from 0 to I; and the X axis are the values for power distance which range from zero to seven. For example, when PD = 0, tbe probability of family-owned measure. Instead, we include tne classification table figure as an indication of firm is 0.50 when PD increases to I, the probability rises to just short of0.64. goodness of fit (which considered accepfable when above 50%). As evident in Table 2 , the regressi n was significant with.JLQ-value of 0.048. fumotheses I and,_?,; .{egarding the pos tive 
I I
In Greece, for example, the marginal impact ofPD on the probability of having above average concentration is 0.83.
Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we provide a clear answer to the research question whether cultural differences impact the prevalence of family-owned firms. By examining 42 countries, we discovered that the pervasiveness of family-owned firms is indeed influenced by the local culture. In our empirical test, we used three cultural variables: power distance, in-group collectivism, and intolerance to uncertainty. In a country with high power distance and high ingroup collectivism, a patriarch, and through him, his family, are respected, obeyed and enjoy the cooperation of the firm's constituency, which increases the effectiveness of the family-owned firm and, hence, its prosperity. In a 'country with low tolerance for uncertainty, there is demand for assurance provided by having family members as partners. We find that the first two variables explain the differential prevalence of family-owned firms significantly better than the economic variables that determine the ease with which a family-owned firm can raise outside capital, including mandatory disclosure requirement. In conclusion, this study augments our knowledge about the importance of cultural differences for family ownership by studying specific cultural dimensions beyond religion, language, and legal environment studied previously.
